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Poor countries are more volatile than rich countries, and we know this volatility impedes their growth.
We also know that commodity price volatility is a key source of those shocks. This paper explores
commodity and manufactures price over the past three centuries to answer three questions: Has commodity
price volatility increased over time? The answer is no: there is little evidence of trend since 1700. Have
commodities always shown greater price volatility than manufactures? The answer is yes. Higher commodity
price volatility is not the modern product of asymmetric industrial organizations - oligopolistic manufacturing
versus competitive commodity markets - that only appeared with the industrial revolution. It was a
fact of life deep into the 18th century. Does world market integration breed more or less commodity
price volatility? The answer is less. Three centuries of history shows unambiguously that economic
isolation caused by war or autarkic policy has been associated with much greater commodity price
volatility, while world market integration associated with peace and pro-global policy has been associated
with less commodity price volatility. Given specialization and comparative advantage, globalization
has been good for growth in poor countries at least by diminishing price volatility. But comparative
advantage has never been constant. Globalization increased poor country specialization in commodities
when the world went open after the early 19th century; but it did not do so after the 1970s as the Third
World shifted to labor-intensive manufactures. Whether price volatility or specialization dominates






















1. Commodity Price Volatility and Development 
 
Poor countries are more volatile than rich countries. This fact is not only a problem in 
itself, but it also impairs future growth prospects, especially in countries with imperfect capital 
markets. Miklós Koren and Silvana Tenreyro (2007) decompose the sources of this excess 
volatility in poor countries into various components, and find that roughly half can be explained 
by the fact that developing countries experience bigger and more frequent aggregate shocks than 
do rich countries. This paper is concerned with the other half of the story, that developing 
countries specialize in fewer and more volatile economic activities. 
Poor countries have a more highly concentrated production structure, which leaves them 
more vulnerable to sectoral shocks, given that they do not diversify their risk across sectors as 
much as do rich countries (Koren and Tenreyro 2007). They also specialize in activities which 
are inherently more volatile. In addition, poor country industries face more elastic demand 
curves (and unskilled labor supply curves), while rich country industries face more inelastic 
demand curves (and skilled labor supply curves), so that supply shocks lead to more quantity 
adjustment in poor countries. Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura (2007) provide one explanation for 
the latter phenomenon: unskilled-labor-abundant countries tend to specialize in unskilled-labor-
intensive sectors using traditional technologies. Finally, given that innovation in today’s world 
economy largely takes place in rich skill-abundant countries, new technologies tend to be skill-
using (Acemoglu 1998), and hence poorer countries end up specializing in industries which use 
traditional, low-productivity and slow-changing technologies.  
Poor countries also face higher volatility since they specialize in agricultural and mineral 
production. Primary products, or export commodities as they are often called, experience far   4
greater price volatility than do manufactures or services, although this is more often assumed 
than demonstrated in the literature.
1 One exception to the “no evidence” rule is UNCTAD (2008: 
p. 38-40), which provides graphical evidence of higher price volatility for non-fuel commodities 
and petroleum than for manufactures between 1970 and 2008. Another is Ilse Mintz (1967), who, 
more than forty years ago, documented lower US export price volatility for finished 
manufactures than for semi-manufactures, crude materials or food between 1880 and 1963. It is 
this distinction between rich and poor countries that motivates the present paper. Less 
diversification and more specialization in more volatile activities yields more volatile terms of 
trade, a major source of the overall economic instability which poor countries face. Table 1 
shows that this has indeed been the case since 1960. Compared with the manufactures-exporting 
industrial economics, the rest of the world had far higher terms of trade volatility, indeed more 
than three times higher in Latin America, South Asia and Africa.  
Recent analysis of modern Third World economies informs us that price volatility of this 
sort is bad for long run growth. Observers regularly point to commodity price and terms of trade 
shocks as a key source of macroeconomic instability in commodity-specialized countries, but, 
until very recently, they paid far less attention to the long run growth implications of such 
instability.
2 Economists stress the investment channel in looking for connections between 
commodity price volatility and growth. Indeed, the development literature offers abundant 
contemporary microeconomic evidence linking income volatility to lower investment in physical 
                                                 
1 Here are two examples. Radetzki (2008: pp. 64-6) discusses the “well-known and off-repeated”  observation that 
commodity prices are extremely volatile, and that “the prices of manufactures tend to be more stable”. He provides 
evidence of volatile commodity prices, and discusses why these might be expected to be more volatile than 
manufactured prices. However, he does not provide or cite empirical evidence regarding the relative volatility of the 
two types of prices. Szirma (2005: p. 543), on the other hand, takes the view that “prices of primary exports turn out 
to be no more unstable than those of manufactured goods or capital goods”, again without providing evidence. 
2 For important early exceptions, see Easterly et al. (1993), Deaton and Miller (1996), Mendoza (1997), Deaton 
(1999), Kose and Reizman (2001), and Bleaney and Greenway (2001). The more recent (booming) literature is 
reviewed below in the text. 
   5
capital, human capital and even research and development. Households imperfectly protected 
from risk change their income-generating activities in the face of income volatility, diversifying 
towards low-risk alternatives with lower average returns, as well as to lower levels of investment 
(Roumasset 1976, 1979; Rosenweig and Wolpin 1993; Dercon 2004; Fafchamps 2003). 
Furthermore, severe cuts in health and education follow negative income shocks to poor 
households in the Third World — cuts that disproportionately affect children and hence long 
term human capital accumulation (Jensen 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Frankenburg et al. 
1999; Thomas et al. 2004). 
Poor households find it difficult to smooth their expenditures in the face of shocks 
because they are rationed in (or even excluded from) credit and insurance markets, so they lower 
investment and take fewer risks with what remains. Poor, small family firms (also excluded from 
credit and insurance markets) find it difficult to smooth net returns on their assets, so they lower 
investment and take fewer risks with what remains. Perhaps most importantly, revenue sources 
geared to taxes on import and export trade
3 will themselves be volatile. Thus, poor governments 
whose revenue sources are mainly customs duties (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004; 
Williamson 2006; Bates et al. 2007) and which also find it difficult to borrow at cheap rates 
locally and internationally, cannot, without serious difficulty, smooth public investment on 
infrastructure and education in the face of terms of trade shocks.
4 Lower public investment 
ensues, and growth rates fall. In short, theory informs us that higher volatility in commodity 
                                                 
3 To state the obvious, the first order effect is directly on export taxes given price volatility of export commodities, 
but the (bigger) second order indirect effect is on import customs revenues as import demand exhibits the same 
volatility due to the impact of export earnings on domestic income.  
4 While greater volatility increases the need for international borrowing to help smooth domestic consumption, 
Catão and Kapur (2004) have shown recently that volatility constrained the ability to borrow between 1970 and 
2001. It seems likely that the same was true between 1870 and 1901, a century earlier, and even more so before 
1870 when a global capital market was only just emerging (Obsfelt and Taylor 2004; Mauro et al. 2006). 
   6
prices and the terms of trade should reduce investment and growth in the presence of risk 
aversion. In addition, the less-risky investment that does take place will also be low-return.  
Modern evidence seems to be consistent with the theory. Using data from 92 developing 
and developed economies between 1962 and 1985, Garey and Valerie Ramey (1995) found 
government spending and macroeconomic volatility to be inversely related, and that countries 
with higher volatility had lower mean growth. This result has since been confirmed for a more 
recent cross-section of 91 countries (Fatás and Mihov 2006). Studies like these have repeatedly 
found that macroeconomic volatility diminishes long run growth (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003; 
Hnatkovska and Loayza 2005; Loayza et al. 2007), and we now know more about why it is 
especially acute in poor countries. In an impressive analysis of more than 60 countries between 
1970 and 2003, Steven Poelhekke and Frederick van der Ploeg (2007) find strong support for the 
core-periphery asymmetry hypothesis regarding volatility, and with a large set of controls. 
Furthermore, while capricious policy and political violence can and did add to volatility in poor 
countries, extremely volatile commodity prices “are the main reason why natural resources 
export revenues are so volatile” (Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2007: p. 3), and thus why those 
economies are themselves so volatile. While we have offered some reasons why poor countries 
face higher volatility and why that higher volatility costs them so much more in diminished 
growth rates, Philippe Aghion and his collaborators (2005, 2006) offer more: macroeconomic 
volatility driven either by nominal exchange rate or commodity price movements will depress 
growth in poor economies with weak financial institutions and rigid nominal wages, both of 
which characterized all poor economies in the past even more than today.
5 Thus, “given the high 
volatility of primary commodity prices … of many resource-rich countries, we expect resources-
                                                 
5 See also Aizenman and Marion (1999), Flug et al. (1999), Elbers et al. (2007), and Koren and Tenreyro (2007).   7
rich countries with poorly developed financial systems to have poor growth performance” 
(Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2007: p. 6).  
Finally, recent work by economic historians has confirmed that price volatility was also 
bad for growth in poor (but not in rich) primary producing countries between 1870 and 1940 
(Blattman et al. 2007; Williamson 2008). 
 
2. International Trade and Terms of Trade Volatility 
 
International trade might be thought to encourage terms of trade volatility, since it leads 
to specialization. If the specialization is in commodities rather than manufactures or services, 
then trade will increase terms of trade volatility even more. These arguments hold, keeping 
constant the price volatility of individual commodities. In this paper, however, we will look more 
closely at long run trends in the price volatility of individual goods, and ask whether this 
volatility has changed over time. Were commodity prices just as volatile two or three hundred 
years ago as they are today? Have they always been more volatile than the prices of 
manufactured goods? And, crucially, has this price volatility experience varied with how well 
local economies are integrated into a larger world economy? The latter point is particularly 
important, since if international trade lowers the price volatility of individual commodities, then 
it might on balance lead to a more stable price environment overall, even for countries with a 
comparative advantage in primary products. 
Why might trade lower the volatility of individual commodity prices? The idea, of 
course, is that local shocks to supply and demand are stabilized when the local economy trades   8
with the large world economy. Thus, when the world went global in the early 19
th century after 
the European wars, did commodity prices become less volatile as small local economies became 
integrated with large world markets? When the world went autarkic between the World Wars, 
did commodity prices become more volatile, for symmetric reasons? What about war and peace? 
Were commodity prices more volatile during the French Wars of the late 18
th and early 19
th 
century, and during World War I and World War II, than during the long 19
th century pax 
Britannica or the pro-global decades since 1970? What does history tell us about the commodity 
price volatility and world market integration connection? 
This is hardly the first time that these questions have been raised, although this paper will 
be the first time, to our knowledge, that these questions have been confronted with extensive 
long run price evidence. Karl Gunnar Persson, scholar of medieval and early modern European 
grain markets, tells us how central these questions were to the 18
th century physiocrats, or what 
Persson calls les économistes. As far as les économistes were concerned, “the best and favoured 
remedy against price fluctuations was market integration, and its prerequisite was free trade in 
grain” (Persson 1999: p. 7). Furthermore, it appears that les économistes anticipated the modern 
development economist’s conclusion that volatility is bad for growth by more than 300 years: 
“One of the accomplishments of [les économistes] was the claim that price volatility … had 
disincentive effects on investment and effort in agriculture … and that [it was] a prime cause for 
the distressed state of agriculture” (Persson 1999: p. 7). One of the earliest of les économistes, 
the Englishman Charles Davenant, asserted in 1699 that “a stable price would reign if [national 
grain] markets were permitted to trade since price differences would make traders move grain 
from surplus to deficit regions or nations” (Persson 1999: pp. 8-9, citing Davenant 1699: p. 82).  
So, were les économistes right?   9
3. Commodity Price Volatility since 1700: Data and Measurement 
 
Three questions motivate this paper. First, when the world went from anti-global (pre-
1820) to pro-global (1820-1913), and went again a century later from anti-global (1914-1949) to 
pro-global (1950-2009), did commodity price volatility fall? Second, has there been any secular 
trend in commodity price volatility since 1700, or has it been a constant fact of economic life? 
Third, have primary product commodities always had more volatile prices than manufactured 
goods, or did this difference arise only with modern capitalism and the price stickiness 
associated with less competitive industrial organizations in manufacturing compared with the  
primary sector?  
 
Three Hundred Years of Price Data 
  The most recent and comprehensive paper on modern commodity price behavior is by 
Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2007). The price data used there are “monthly averages of free-
market price indices for all food, agricultural raw materials, minerals, ores & metals, crude 
petroleum (average of Dubai/Brent/Texas equally weighted). Base year 2000 = 100.” The source 
of these data is UNCTAD, Commodity Price Statistics (2007). We will use similar free market 
price statistics, except that they will be quoted in local city markets, so that they will reflect the 
impact of tariffs and embargoes. Our data are monthly price quotes for various items which are 
allocated, following UNCTAD classifications, to three groups: all food = AF, agricultural raw 
materials = ARM, and minerals, ores and metals = MOM. We add a fourth group for   10
manufactures or final goods = FG. These are further aggregated into all items = ALL and all 
commodities = COM. 
Table 2 describes the data in greater detail. Nine series are monthly and listed in Panel 
2A. The famous Philadelphia data base collected by Anne Bezanson and her collaborators (1935, 
1936, 1951 and 1954) is in four parts, 1720-1775 (19 items), 1770-1790 (25 items), 1784-1861 
(133 items), and 1852-1896 (100 items). The Dutch data collected by Nicolaas Posthumus 
(1946) and the Danish data collected by Astrid Friis and Kristof Glamann (1958) are both much 
shorter (1750-1800), and smaller (49 and 29 items). The data underlying the Gayer-Rostow-
Schwartz (1953) British commodity price index for 1790-1850 contain 69 items. Our historical 
price data base is augmented with the monthly commodity price series published by the IMF (45 
series) for 1980-2008 and UNCTAD (52 series) for 1960-2007. As we shall see below (Table 6), 
we also have quarterly data for United States exports 1880-1963. 
In Panel 2B, two annual series are listed. The English series collected by Gregory Clark 
(2005) covers 1700-1869, and contains 36 items. The Sauerbeck (1886-1917) and Statist (1930) 
annual British price series cover 1850-1950, and contain 41 items. The annual series have, of 
course, lower frequency, and thus are not exactly comparable to the monthly series, but they do 
offer the advantage of more observations from the world’s most important 19
th century market – 
Great Britain – and, perhaps more importantly, coverage of the first half of the 20
th century. The 
AF category is represented by, among others: beef, butter, cheese, codfish, coffee, corn, flour, 
herring, molasses, oats, pepper, pork, rice, rye, salt, sugar, tea and wheat; the ARM category by: 
cotton, flax, hemp, indigo, logwood, leather, linseed oil, sperm oil, starch, staves, tallow and 
tobacco; the MOM category by: alum, ashes, brimstone, coal, copper, lead, nitrate, and saltpeter; 
and the FG category by: brandy, candles, cordage, duck cloth, gin, gunpowder, bar iron, pig iron,   11
sheet iron, nails, shingles, shoes, shot, soap, steel, thread, tin plate, turpentine, wine, wool cloth, 
and yarn. Appendix I provides full details for the commodities and classifications employed 
below for the historical price data, while Appendix II repeats the exercise for the IMF and 
UNCTAD data. 
 
4. Commodity Price Volatility since 1700: Analysis 
 
Have Commodity Prices Always Been More Volatile? 
  Have commodities always exhibited greater volatility than manufactures?  The answer is 
unambiguous: yes. Table 3 reports the price volatility of all items, primary product commodities 
(COM) and final manufactured goods (FG) for the two centuries between 1700 and 1896. 
Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the price ratio, ln(Pt/Pt-1), that is, the standard 
deviation of the percentage changes in price over a given period. For instance, in the first row of 
Table 3, we calculate our metric for volatility over the entire set of 672 (=56*12) monthly 
observations available for Philadelphia from 1720 to 1775. In the case of annual prices, as in the 
seventh row of Table 3—that for England from 1700 to 1819—we likewise gather all available 
observations on the logged price ratio (in this case, N=120) and calculate the standard deviation. 
The volatility of COM and FG relative to all items is also reported in parentheses. In every case 
over these 200 years, the relative volatility indicator is less than 100 for FG. In some cases where 
the FG sample is very small, the difference between the volatility of the two commodity 
categories is small. This is particularly true of the data for 1720-1775 Philadelphia, where we 
have just three observations for the FG category (and they are all for spirits). Apart from that   12
case, price volatility for manufactured goods ranged from 74 percent less (Denmark 1750-1800) 
to 9 percent less (Britain 1790-1819) than the average volatility for all goods. The unweighted 
average between 1700 and 1896 tells us that manufactured goods prices were 25 percent less 
volatile than all items, while commodity prices were 5 percent more volatile; alternatively, the 
price volatility for commodities was 40 percent higher than for manufactures. The figures for US 
export price volatility 1880-1963 (Table 6) are very similar: manufactured goods prices had 25 
percent less volatility than all items, while commodity prices had 19 percent more; alternatively, 
the price volatility of commodities was 59 percent higher than that of manufactures. 
  While commodity prices have always been more volatile than manufactures, given what 
we know about the much greater terms of trade volatility in poor countries than in rich (Table 1; 
Williamson 2008), one might have expected an even bigger difference than the 40-59 percent 
average over the two and a half centuries before 1950. Recall, however, that the higher terms of 
trade volatility in primary product exporting countries has two parts: they specialize in 
commodities that are 40-59 percent more price volatile, and they have higher product 
concentration and thus lower diversification. 
  The results in Table 3 also offer little support for the hypothesis that commodity prices 
became more volatile than industrial prices because movements in the latter have been dampened 
by the rise of the modern industrial corporation, a view championed by Raúl Prebisch (1950) 
more than 50 years ago.
6 If this were the case, then the gap between the volatility for the two 
categories should only have emerged some time in the late 19
th century. To be sure, the data for 
Philadelphia indicate that the difference between COM and FG was notably less pronounced 
before 1790 than afterwards, but, as has been suggested already, this may be a function of the 
                                                 
6 See the excellent survey in Cuddington et al. (2007).   13
small number of goods included in the data base for the earlier years. More to the point, the 
timing of this shift is too early to fit the Prebisch hypothesis. Moreover, there is little difference 
between the relative volatility of manufactured goods prices during the two sub-periods 1784-
1861 and 1852-1896 (with the lower relative volatility of industrial prices actually being 
somewhat less in the latter period). As the next section will make clear, the latter comparison 
may be affected by the fact that both sub-periods included episodes of war as well as of peace, 
and so Table 3 also provides a comparison between 1873-84 and 1885-96. These results do show 
a decline in the relative volatility of manufactured goods over the course of the late 19
th century, 
and the timing here is consistent with the rise of the modern corporation. Overall, however, the 
main message emerging from these data is that commodity prices have been more volatile than 
manufactured goods prices over the past three centuries, not just today, or just since the 1950s. 
 
Have Commodity Prices Become More Volatile Over Time? 
Has the price volatility of commodities risen over time, so that modern commodity 
exporters suffer more economic volatility than they did 300 years ago? The answer here is again 
unambiguous, but this time, it is no. This finding requires two qualifications. First, since it is 
unwise to make comparisons between market locations -- the samples being different between 
them -- we can only explore this question by looking within market locations. Table 3 offers no 
support for the rising volatility hypothesis within the Philadelphia 1720-1896 series, within the 
English 1700-1869 series, or within the British 1790-1850 series. Table 4 offers more evidence, 
since the Sauerbeck-Statist data have been added. Comparing peacetime with peacetime (see the 
next section), the Clark data show higher volatility during 1820-60 than during 1700-1775; 
however, the Sauerbeck-Statist data show no evidence of a secular peacetime rise from 1850   14
onwards, and the same is true of US export prices from 1880 to 1963 (Table 6). We will have 
more to say about the war and interwar evidence in a moment.  
The second qualification to this finding comes from the post-1960 data in Table 5. 
Neither the IMF nor the UNCTAD data show a clear rising trend in commodity price volatility 
from the 1980s onwards. However, the UNCTAD data do show that price volatility was 
considerably lower in the 1960s than subsequently. In order to conclude unambiguously that this 
constituted an upward trend following the Second World War, rather than that the 1960s were 
simply a period of unusually low price volatility, we would need data documenting the late 
1940s and 1950s compared to what followed. Mintz (1967: Table A-3, pp. 300-7) offers the only 
evidence which we have been able to uncover which can be used to confront the issue of 
unusually low price volatility during this period, and her quarterly data are used to calculate the 
price volatility reported in Table 6. US export prices between 1950 and 1963 exhibited about one 
third the volatility that they did between 1880 and 1950. Prices of US food and finished 
manufactured exports exhibited pretty much the same pattern, as did prices of US semi-
manufactured and crude material exports (although neither can be documented over the full 
period). We also know that the 1960s were a period of macroeconomic and exchange rate 
stability, relative to what came subsequently, and this might perhaps explain the contrast 
between what is called the Bretton Woods period and what followed. Indeed, John Cuddington 
and Hong Liang (2003) show that over the period 1880-1996, there was greater volatility in the 
relative price of commodities to manufactured goods during periods of floating exchange rates 
than during periods of fixed exchange rates. The evidence in Tables 5 and 6 shows that what was 
true of this relative price was also true of both the numerator and the denominator by themselves.   15
This result mirrors the findings reported by Paul Cashin and John McDermott (2002) that there 
was an increase in the volatility of the Economist’s industrial commodity price index after 1971.
7  
 
Are Commodity Prices More Volatile During War and Anti-Global Autarkic Regimes? 
If local shocks to supply and demand matter less for domestic prices when the local 
economy trades with the large world economy, commodity prices should be less volatile when 
the world is more pro-global. Thus, did commodity prices become less volatile when the world 
went global in the 19
th century after the European wars, and did commodity prices become more 
volatile when the world went autarkic between the World Wars? Table 4 strongly confirms these 
predictions. 
First, consider the wars of 1776-1815, which severely disrupted commodity markets 
worldwide (O’Rourke 2006), especially in the Atlantic economy from whence our data are 
drawn. The Clark and Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz series for England, the Friis-Glamann series for 
Denmark, the Posthumus series for the Netherlands and the Bezanson series for Philadelphia all 
show higher price volatility during war (1776-1819) than in either the previous or the subsequent 
period. In all cases bar one (the Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz series) the differences between sub-
periods are statistically significant.
8 It seems that the French and American Revolutionary Wars, 
the Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812, did not just lead to terms of trade deteriorations 
across the Atlantic economy, and hence to sizeable welfare losses (Irwin 2005; O’Rourke 2007). 
They also increased price volatility. If this had the same negative impact on investment as it does 
in developing countries today, then this would have reduced growth over and above the negative 
                                                 
7 The Economists’s industrial commodities price index is heavily weighted towards commodities, although it also 
includes some basic manufactured goods.  
8  The p-value of an F test on the equality of variances in the latter case is equal to 0.1467.   16
effects which wartime investment crowding out would have implied on its own (Williamson 
1984). 
These data can also be used to explore the impact of the American Civil War on 
commodity price volatility. Again, we know from the literature on the Cotton Famine that the 
Civil War had an impact on the terms of trade in cotton-importing and cotton-exporting parts of 
the world, but did it increase commodity price volatility? In Britain, which was not a belligerent, 
the answer appears to be no, according to the Sauerbeck-Statist evidence. Britain’s terms of trade 
may have deteriorated as a result of greater US cotton scarcity, but it was still trading freely with 
the rest of the world, and there was no increase in price volatility there. The United States 
underwent a quite different experience: the Bezanson price data show a very large (and 
statistically significant) increase in volatility during 1861-72 as compared to what came before or 
after, a result consistent with the fact that much of the American economy was cut off from 
world markets during the conflict. The biggest anti-global world regime in our period, however, 
was 1914-1950, which saw two World Wars and an intervening period characterized by 
Depression and autarky. During the four decades 1914-1950, price volatility was twice as great 
as it was in the peacetime decades that preceded them, at least according to the Sauerbeck-Statist 
evidence. The Mintz quarterly price data whose volatility is summarized in Table 6 certainly 
confirms this for the autarkic interwar decades: the average volatility figure for all commodities 
1920-1950 is 0.039, or half again higher than the average for 1880-1914 and 1950-1963 (0.026). 
This finding mirrors that of Frederick Mills (1926: p. 46) who almost a century ago found that 
two thirds of the commodities whose prices he was investigating displayed greater price 
volatility during 1922-25 than during 1906-13. His conclusion was that “The influence of the 
war-time disturbances upon individual prices has persisted, apparently, and, in so far as the four   17
years from 1922 to 1925 may be used as a criterion, has left us with more variable prices than we 
had during the years immediately preceding the war.” 
As previously mentioned, Cuddington and Liang (2003) have explored the volatility of  
the price of commodities relative to the price of manufactured goods. Using the Grilli-Yang data 
(1988), they find that volatility was lower in 1946-71 than in any subperiod between 1914 and 
1938 (although as already mentioned, volatility then increased substantially after 1972).
9 Cashin 
and McDermott (2002) find that the Economist’s annual industrial commodity price index 1862-
1999 documents a volatility increase in the early 1900s (with the First World War appearing to 
be an important breakpoint), and again after 1971. Unfortunately they do not present the data in 
such as way as to be able to see clearly if the Bretton Woods period saw lower volatility than 
1914-50. However, and as we have seen, the Mintz data in Table 6 does confirm lower price 




This paper is motivated by the common observation that poor countries are more volatile 
than rich countries, and that this volatility impedes their growth performance. Furthermore, it 
appears that roughly half of this excess volatility can be explained by the fact that poor countries 
experience bigger and more frequent aggregate shocks than do rich countries. Finally, it also 
appears that commodity price volatility is a key source of those shocks. 
                                                 
9  On the other hand, using the Boughton (1991) data, they find that although 1946-71 volatility was lower than 
1927-38 volatility, it was higher than volatility between 1914 and 1926, and that volatility after 1972 was higher 
still.   18
Here we explore price data for primary products (commodities) and manufactures over 
the past three centuries to answer three questions: First, has commodity price volatility increased 
over time? The answer is unambiguously no. Indeed, there is little evidence of trend since 1700. 
Second, have commodities always shown greater price volatility than manufactures? The answer 
is unambiguously yes. Higher commodity price volatility is not some Prebisch-like modern 
product of asymmetric industrial organization – monopolistic and oligopolistic manufacturing 
versus competitive commodity markets – that only appeared with the industrial revolution. 
Instead, it was a fact of life deep into the 18
th century. Third, do globalization and world market 
integration breed more or less commodity price volatility? The answer is less. One can imagine a 
tug of war between two off-setting forces: on the one hand, the impact of supply shocks in 
commodity-exporting countries is diminished by the integration of small local markets with large 
world markets; but on the other hand, by their integration into world markets commodity-
exporting countries expose themselves to world demand instability generated by cyclical booms 
and busts in the industrial countries. Three centuries of history shows unambiguously that the 
former dominates the latter: economic isolation caused by war or autarkic policy has been 
associated with much greater commodity price volatility, while world market integration 
associated with peace and pro-global policy has been associated with less commodity price 
volatility. Given specialization and comparative advantage, globalization has been good for 
growth in poor countries to the extent that it has reduced commodity price volatility. But, of 
course, specialization is not given, but rather endogenous to policy regimes. Thus, globalization 
also increased poor country specialization in commodities when the world went open after the 
early 19
th century; but it did not do so after the 1970s as the Third World shifted to labor-
intensive manufactures (Martin 2007). Whether the price volatility or the specialization effect   19
dominates may thus be conditional on the century. In any case, since this issue deals with 
countries, while the present paper deals with individual commodities, the answer must be left to 
future research.
10    
                                                 
10 Some answers are already beginning to emerge in Blattman et al. (2007) and Williamson (ongoing).   20
Appendix 1: Commodity Classifications for Historical Price Data 
Philadelphia, 1720-1775 
AF: Beef; Bread, middling; Corn; Flour; Molasses; Pork; Rice; Salt, coarse; Salt, fine; Sugar, 
Muscavado; Wheat. 
ARM: Pitch; Staves, hogshead; Staves, pipe; Tar. 
FG: Rum, West Indian; Turpentine; Wine, Madeira. 
Philadelphia, 1770-1795 
AF: Beef; Bread, ship; Chocolate; Coffee; Flour, common; Flour, middling; Flour, superior; 
Molasses; Pepper; Pork; Rice; Sugar, loaf; Sugar, Muscavado; Tea, Bohea; Wheat. 
ARM: Cotton; Indigo; Leather, sole; Tar; Tobacco 
FG: Iron, bar; Rum, West Indian; Turpentine; Wine 
Philadelphia, 1786-1861 
AF: Almonds; Beef; Beef, mess; Bread; Bread, pilot; Butter; Cheese; Chocolate; Clove; Cocoa; 
Codfish, dried; Coffee; Corn; Corn meal; Currents; Flaxseed; Flour, superfine; Ginseng; Hams; 
Herring; Honey; Lard; Lemons; Mace; Mackerel; Mackerel 1; Mackerel 3; Molasses; Nutmeg; 
Oats; Peas; Pepper; Pimento; Pork; Pork, Burlington & mess; Pork, prime; Raisins; Rice; Rye; 
Rye meal; Salt, coarse; Salt, fine; Sugar, Havana brown; Sugar, Havana white; Sugar, loaf & 
lump; Tea; Tea, Hyson; Tea, Souchong; Wheat. 
ARM: Beaver; Beeswax, yellow; Cotton; Deer skins; Feathers; Flax; Fustic; Hemp, Russian; 
Hides; Indigo; Leather; Logwood; Logwood, Campeachy; Muskrat; Oil, linseed; Oil, sweet; Oil, 
sperm; Oil, whale; Pine, heart & panel; Pine, sap; Pitch; Rosin; Spirits of turpentine; Starch; 
Staves, barrel; Staves, hogshead; Staves, pipe; Tallow; Tar; Tobacco, James River; Tobacco, 
Kentucky 
MOM: Alum; Ashes, pearl; Ashes, pot; Brimstone, rolls; Coal, Virginia; Copper, sheathing; 
Lead; Lead, red dry; Lead, white dry; Lead, white in oil; Saltpeter, refined; Verdigris.  
FG: Brandy, French; Candles, sperm; Candles, tallow; Candles, tallow tipped; Candles, tallow 
mold; Copperas; Cordage, foreign; Duck, bear ravens; Gin, Holland; Ginger, ground; 
Gunpowder; Iron, bar domestic; Iron, bar foreign; Iron, bar Swedish; Iron, pig; Iron, sheet; Nails; 
Plaster of Paris; Rum, New England; Sheeting, Russian brown; Shingles; Shot; Soap, Castile; 
Soap, white; Soap, yellow; Spanish Brown, dry; Spanish Brown, in oil; Steel, American; Steel, 
English; Steel, German, Steel, T Crowley; Tin, plate; Turpentine; Wine, Lisbon; Wine, Madeira; 
Wine, Malaga; Wine, port; Wine, sherry; Wine, Tenerife cargo. 
Philadelphia, 1852-1896 
AF: Almonds; Beef, dried; Beef, hams; Beef, mess; Butter; Cheese; Cloves; Cocoa; Codfish, 
dried; Coffee; Corn; Corn meal; Currants; Flour, Superfine; Ginger, race; Hams; Herring; Lard; 
Lemons; Mace; Mackerel; Molasses; Nutmeg; Oats; Pepper; Pimento; Pork, Burlington & mess; 
Raisins; Rice; Rye; Salt, coarse; Salt, fine; Sugar, loaf & lump; Tea; Tea, Hyson; Tea, Souchong; 
Wheat, red Pennsylvania.   21
ARM: Beaver; Beeswax, yellow; Cotton, LA & MS; Deer skins; Feathers; Fustic; Hemp, 
Russian; Hides; Indigo; Leather; Logwood; Logwood, Campeachy; Muskrat; Oil, linseed; Oil, 
sperm; Oil, whale; Pine, heart & panel; Pitch; Rosin; Starch; Staves, barrel; Staves, hogshead; 
Staves, pipe; Tallow; Tar. 
MOM: Alum; Ashes, pearl; Ashes, pot; Brimstone, rolls; Coal, bituminous; Copper, sheathing; 
Lead, bar; Lead, red dry; Lead, white dry; Lead, white in oil; Saltpeter, refined; Verdigris 
FG: Candles, adamantine; Candles, sperm; Copperas; Cordage, foreign; Gin, Holland; 
Gunpowder; Iron, bar domestic; Iron, pig; Iron, sheet; Nails; Plaster of Paris; Rum, New 
England; Sheeting, Russian brown; Shingles; Shot; Soap, Castile; Spirits of turpentine; Steel, 
American; Steel, English; Steel, German; Tin, plate; Wine, Madeira; Wine, Malaga; Wine, port; 
Wine, sherry. 
Britain, 1790-1850 
AF: Beef; Butter; Cinnamon; Cocoa; Coffee; Ginger; Liqourice; Oats; Pepper; Pork; Seeds; 
Sugar; Tea; Wheat. 
ARM: Annato; Balsam; Barilla; Beeswax; Bristles; Camphor; Cochineal; Cotton; Flax; Fustic; 
Hemp; Hides; Indigo; Isinglass; Leather butts; Linseed; Linseed oil; Logwood; Madder root; 
Mahogany; Olive oil; Quinine; Rape oil; Raw silk; Starch; Staves; Sumac; Tallow; Tar; Timber; 
Tobacco; Whale fins; Whale oil; Wool. 
MOM: Alum; Ashes; Brimstone; Copper; Lead; Quicksilver; Sal Ammoniac; Saltpetre; Vitriol. 
FG: Brandy; Iron; Iron, bars; Iron, pig; Rum; Silk, thrown; Soap, mottled; Soap, yellow; Tin, 
black; Turpentine; Wine. 
Denmark, 1750-1800 
AF: Bacon; Barley; Barley groats; Buckwheat groats; Butter, Funen; Cheese, Holstein; Cod, 
Icelandic salted; Cod, split; Herring, Danish autumn; Malt; Oatmeal; Oats; Peas; Rye, Danish; 
Salt, Copenhagen; Salt, Spanish; Stockfish, Icelandic; Wheat, Danish. 
ARM: Beechwood, Holstein; Flax; Hemp; Hops, Brunswick; Tallow; Tar; Train oil. 
FG: Brandy, French; Iron, Norwegian; Soap, soft; Wine, French. 
The Netherlands, 1750-1800 
AF: Barley, Frisian winter; Beans, horse; Buckwheat, Brabant; Candy, white; Cinnamon; 
Cloves; Cocoa, Caracas; Nutmeg; Oats, forage; Rye, Konigsberg; Salt, white; Stockfish, split; 
Sugar, loaf; Sugar, refined; Sugar, Surinam; Tea, Buoy; Treacle; Wheat, Polish. 
ARM: Camphor, refined; Codliver oil; Coleseed, Flemish; Cotton, Smyrna; Hides, native, salted; 
Indigo, Java; Linseed, Riga, crushed; Linseed oil; Madder, common; Opium; Rape oil; Sole 
leather; Starch; Tobacco; Train, oil; Whale bones; Wool, Andalusian; Wool, Segovia, washed. 
MOM: Alum, English; Borax, refined; Lead, white; Potash, Dantzig; Sulphur, refined.  
FG: Copperas, English; Gunpowder; Iron, single, white; Sail yarn; Soap, Marseilles; Thread, 
card, Maastricht; Turpentine, Venetian; Wine, Bordeaux. 
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England, 1700-1869 
AF: Barley; Beans; Beef; Beer, strong; Butter; Cheese; Eggs; Flour; Milk; Mutton; Oats; Peas; 
Pork; Raisins; Rice; Salt; Sugar; Wheat; Wheat flour. 
ARM: Firewood; Hay; Hops; Lamp oil; Suet; Wood; Wool. 
MOM: Coal; Coal, London; Coal, rest of England. 
FG: Candles, tallow; Cloth, wool; Clothing; Iron manufactureds; Paper, foolscap; Shoes; Soap. 
Britain, 1850-1950 
AF: Bacon; Barley; Beef, middling; Beef, prime; Butter; Coffee, Ceylon; Coffee, Rio; Flour; 
Maize; Mutton, middling; Mutton, prime; Oats; Pork; Potatoes; Rice; Sugar, Java; Tea; Wheat, 
English. 
ARM: Cotton; Cotton, Dollegargh; Flax, Russian; Hemp, Manila; Hemp, Russian; Hides, 
Argentine; Indigo; Jute; Leather; Linseed oil; Olive oil; Palm oil; Seeds; Silk; Timber, hewn; 
Wool, Adelaide; Wool, English; Wool, Merino. 
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Appendix 2: Commodity Classifications for Modern Price Data 
IMF, 1980-2008 
AF: Bananas, Central American and Ecuador; Barley, Canadian no.1 western; Beef, Australian 
and New Zealand lean fores; Cocoa beans; Coffee, other mild arabicas; Coffee, robusta; Fish, 
farm bred Norwegian salmon; Groundnuts; Lamb, frozen carcass Smithfield London; Maize, 
U.S. No.2 yellow; Olive oil, extra virgin; Oranges; Palm oil; Poultry, whole chicken; Rapeseed 
oil, Crude; Rice, milled white; Shrimp, frozen shell-on headless; Soybean meal; Soybean oil, 
exchange approved grades; Soybeans, United States No. 2 yellow and par; Sugar, European 
import price; Sugar, Free Market; Sugar, U.S. import price; Sunflower oil; Swine, hogs; Tea, 
Mombasa; Wheat, No.1 hard red winter. 
ARM: Cotton, middling; Fishmeal, Peru fish meal/pellets; Hides, heavy native steers; Logs, 
hard, best quality Malaysian meranti; Logs, soft, Douglas fir; Rubber, no.1 rubber smoked sheet; 
Sawnwood, hard, dark red meranti; Sawnwood, soft, Douglas fir; Wool, coarse; Wool, fine. 
MOM: Coal, Australian thermal; Copper, grade A cathode; Iron ore, fine; Lead; Nickel, melting 
grade; Tin, standard grade; Uranium, u3o8; Zinc, high grade. 
UNCTAD, 1960-2007 
AF: Bananas, Central America and Ecuador; Beef, Australia & New Zealand, frozen boneless; 
Cocoa beans; Coconut oil, Philippines; Coffee, Brazilian and other natural arabicas; Coffee, 
Colombian mild arabicas; Coffee, other mild arabicas; Coffee, robustas; Copra, 
Philippines/Indonesia; Cottonseed oil, United States; Fish meal; Groundnut oil; Palm kernel oil, 
Malaysia; Palm oil, mainly Indonesian; Pepper, white Sarawak/Muntok; Rice, Thailand, white 
milled; Soybean meal; Soybean oil; Soybeans, United States, No. 2 yellow; Sugar, in bulk; 
Sunflower oil; Wheat, United States, No. 2 hard red winter.  
ARM: Cattle hides, United States, Chicago packer's heavy native steers; Cotton, Egypt, Giza 88, 
good; Cotton, Pakistan Sind/Punjab, SG Afzal;  Cotton, United States, Memphis/Eastern, 
Middling; Cotton, United States, Memphis/Orleans/Texas, Middling; Jute, Bangladesh, BWD; 
Linseed oil; Rubber, in bales, No. 1 RSS; Sisal, Tanzania/Kenya, No. 2 & 3 long; Sisal, 
Tanzania/Kenya, No. 3 & UG; Tobacco, unmanufactured. 
MOM: Aluminum, high grade; Copper, grade A, electrolytic wire bars/cathodes; Copper, wire 
bars; Iron ore, Brazilian; Lead; Manganese ore; Nickel cathodes; Phosphate rock, Khouribga; 
Tin; Tungsten ore; Zinc, Prime Western; Zinc, special high grade.   24
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South Asia  Sub-Saharan 
Africa
1960s 1.8 5.2 7.2 4.8 12.8 7.2
1970s 5.2 8.2 13 11.5 18 18.2
1980s 3.5 6.1 11 9 10.2 12.2
1990s 2.1 1.9 8.1 7.8 7.8 10.8
Average 3.2 (100) 5.4 (169) 9.8 (306) 8.3 (259) 12.2 (381) 12.1 (378)  
 
Notes: These figures are taken from Loayza et al. (2007: Figure 3, p. 346). Terms of trade 
volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the logarithmic change in terms of trade over 
each of the four decades 1960–2000. 
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Table 2  Commodity Price Data Sources 1700-1950 
      
Market and Commodity  Source  Time Period Number of 
     Commodities
Panel 2A: Monthly Data 
Philadelphia   Bezanson et al. (1936)  1720-1775  19 
AF     11 
ARM     5 
MOM    0 
FG     3 
Philadelphia   Bezanson et al. (1936)  1770-1790  25 
AF     16 
ARM     5 
MOM     0 
FG     4 
Philadelphia   Bezanson et al. (1936)  1784-1861  133 
AF     51 
ARM     31 
MOM     12 
FG     39 
Philadelphia   Bezanson et al. (1954)  1852-1896  100 
AF     37 
ARM     25 
MOM     12 
FG     26 
Denmark  Friis-Glamann (1958)  1750-1800  29 
AF     18 
ARM     7 
MOM    0 
FG     4 
The Netherlands  Posthumus (1946)  1750-1800  49 
AF     18 
ARM     18 
MOM    5 
FG     8 
World  UNCTAD (2007)  1960-2007  52 
AF     23 
ARM     12 
MOM     17 
FG     0 
World  IMF (2008)  1980-2008  45 
AF     27 
ARM     10   32
MOM     8 
FG     0 
      
Britain  Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz (1953) 1790-1850  69 
AF     14 
ARM     35 
MOM    9 
FG     11 
Panel 2B: Annual Data 
England  Clark (2005)  1700-1869  36 
AF     19 
ARM     7 
MOM    3 
FG     7 
Britain  Sauerbeck-Statist (1886-1930)  1850-1950  41 
AF     18 
ARM     18 
MOM    5 
FG     0 
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             Table 3 Commodity versus Manufactures Price Volatility 1700-1896 
 
 
     All Items  Commodities  Manufactures 
      (COM)  (FG) 
American Prices: Bezanson et al.      
1720-1775      0.084  0.085 (101)  0.082 (98) 
1770-1790      0.122  0.126 (103)  0.104 (85) 
1784-1861      0.067  0.073 (109)  0.048 (72) 
1852-1896      0.074  0.079 (107)  0.056 (76) 
         
1873-1884      .0676  .0722 (107)  .0514 (76) 
1885-1896      .0528  .0582 (110)  .0317 (60) 
         
English Prices: Clark         
1700-1819      0.137  0.143 (104)  0.108 (79) 
1820-1869      0.131  0.137 (105)  0.105 (80) 
          
British Prices: Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz     
1790-1819      0.056  0.057 (102)  0.051 (91) 
1820-1850      0.056  0.057 (102)  0.047 (84) 
          
Dutch Prices: Posthumus       
1750-1800      0.043  0.044 (102)  0.037 (86) 
          
Danish Prices: Friis-Glamann     
1750-1800      0.076  0.082 (108)  0.020 (26) 
 
Notes: The Sauerbeck-Statist series does not report data for FG, so it is not used in this table. The 
numbers in parentheses under the COM and FG entries are relative to the total = ALL. See text 
for definition of volatility.Table 4  Price Volatility during War, Peace and Autarky 1700-1950 











1896    
  Peace  War  Peace Peace War  Peace   
Monthly: Bezanson et al.  0.0647  0.1431        
Monthly: Bezanson et al.    0.0731  0.0621       
Monthly: Bezanson et al.        0.0743 0.1005 0.0610    
Monthly:  Friis-Glamann    0.0744  0.0784        













1913  1914-1950 
 
Peace War  Peace  Peace Peace Peace Peace  War & 
Autarky 
Annual:  Clark  0.1180  0.1475  0.1321       
Annual:  Gayer-Rostow-Schwartz    0.0564  0.0559       
Annual:  Sauerbeck-Statist        0.1251 0.1193 0.1153 0.1153 0.2205 
 
Notes: The volatility statistics are for ALL = all items. Clark's English data for 1861-1869 is ignored since the US Civil War did not 
directly affect England except for the cotton famine. See text for definition of volatility.  35
Table 5 Modern Commodity Price Volatility 1960-2005 
 
 
  All Commodities  Food  Agricultural raw 
materials 
Minerals, ores, and 
metals 
UNCTAD Data      
1960  0.0493 0.0553 0.0462 0.0422 
1965  0.0497 0.0576 0.0414 0.0436 
1970  0.0776 0.0867 0.0745 0.0667 
1975  0.0672 0.0805 0.0593 0.0527 
1980  0.0618 0.0752 0.0532 0.0483 
1985  0.0735 0.0827 0.0625 0.0698 
1990  0.0679 0.0822 0.0535 0.0541 
1995  0.0593 0.0709 0.0502 0.0453 
2000  0.0603 0.0711 0.0498 0.0525 
2005  0.0691 0.0665 0.0512 0.0848 
      
IMF Data      
1980  0.0701 0.0772 0.0582 0.0573 
1985  0.0763 0.0820 0.0602 0.0742 
1990  0.0713 0.0793 0.0598 0.0538 
1995  0.0668 0.0738 0.0610 0.0460 
2000  0.0634 0.0694 0.0511 0.0557 
2005  0.0803 0.0804 0.0608 0.0990 
 
Sources and Notes: UNCTAD, Commodity Price Statistics (2008) and IMF, Primary Commodity Prices Database (2008). See text for 
definition of volatility. 
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Crude Materials Semimanufactures Crude Materials Foods
1880-1885 0.0246 0.0277 0.0234 0.0341
1885-1890 0.0302 0.0167 0.0174 0.0254
1890-1895 0.0376 0.0254 0.0538 0.0405
1895-1900 0.0366 0.0322 0.0448 0.047
1900-1905 0.0359 0.0181 0.0633 0.0226
1905-1910 0.0308 0.0117 0.0606 0.027
1910-1914 0.0279 0.0128 0.0405 0.0283
1920-1925 0.0627 0.0428 0.0639 0.1184 0.0921
1925-1930 0.0295 0.0231 0.0349 0.0736 0.0425
1930-1935 0.0376 0.0505 0.0392 0.0612 0.0487
1935-1938 0.0264 0.0177 0.0494 0.0505 0.0459
1945-1950 0.039 0.0432 0.0395 0.0358 0.0515
1950-1955 0.0206 0.0164 0.0415 0.0366 0.0366
1955-1960 0.0082 0.0073 0.0347 0.0142 0.0137
1960-1963 0.0089 0.0074 0.0141 0.0176 0.0066
1950-1963 0.0125 0.0104 0.0225 0.0216 0.0177
1880-1950 0.0349 0.0263 0.0417  
 
Source and Notes: These volatility measures are based on the quarterly data reported in Mintz (1967: Table A-3). See text for 
definition of volatility. 
 